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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic theory that accounts for the evolution of trade policy, un-
derlying internal class conicts, and output growth performance over the last few centuries.
By analyzing political responses to the distributional e¤ects of international trade, it nds a
prominent interaction between trade policy and the pattern of economic development, and also
a signicant role for trade liberalization in economic take-o¤. Consistent with historical evi-
dence for Western Europe, land-scarce economies reach a developed stage through the ebb and
ow of liberalism. In contrast, land-abundant countries tend to stagnate because of landlords
opposition to industrialization.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two centuries, the world economy has witnessed two epochal phenomena never seen
before: the rapid expansion of international trade and the emergence of income gaps between
nations. The approximate growth rate of intercontinental trade was 3.5% per annum in this period,
while the gure was 1.1% per annum between 1500 and 1800 (ORourke and Williamson 2001, Table
1). The gap between the West and the rest of the world in average per capita GDP was nearly 2:1
in 1820, whereas it was as much as 7:1 in 1998 (Maddison 2001, Table 1-9b, 46).
While these gures have brought a potential link between international trade and long-run
growth performance to many economistsattention, there seems to be no established theory that
accounts for their historical relationship. As pointed out by Williamson (2003), the role of inter-
national trade has typically been neglected by the recent literature that analyzes the transition
from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth.1 Even the few exceptions, such as the work of
McDermott (2002) and Galor and Mountford (2003), treat the emergence of international trade as
being exogenous.2 On the other hand, the literature on endogenous tari¤ theory primarily uses
static frameworks that ignore the dynamic aspects of trade and aggregate output.3
This research distinguishes itself from these previous articles by exploring the historical evolution
of trade policy and economic growth. Analyzing political responses to the distributional e¤ects of
trade, the research nds that there is a prominent interaction between trade and growth, and
emphasizes the role of trade liberalization in economic take-o¤.
The analysis is focused on the development of Western Europe since the mid-17th century,
dividing it into three distinct epochs of trade policy.4 In the rst epoch (16601830s), Western
1See, for example, Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil (2000), Kogel and Prskawetz (2001), and
Hansen and Prescott (2002).
2There are two other notable articles relevant to the present paper. McDermott (1999) endogenizes a countrys
openness by incorporating government motivation for mercantilistic protection against the inow of foreign ideas. In
contrast to the present article, McDermott does not study international trade in commodities and, hence, overlooks
the substantial impact of grain inow on the 19th-century European economy. Baldwin et al. (2001) develop a growth
model in which exogenous reductions in the costs of trading goods (such as shipping costs and those associated with
political barriers) promote industrial agglomeration in the North and thereby generate substantial income di¤erences
between the North and the South.
3See Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock and Young (1989), and Grossman and Helpman (1994), among others.
4This paper focuses on the international trade between Western Europe and the rest of the world, including Eastern
Europe, and also focuses on restrictions on importing agricultural goods, rather than manufactured or other goods. As
is well known, the grain trade was initially limited to the European continent because of underdeveloped transport
systems. Amsterdam played a central role in determining grain prices in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries
(Glamann 1974, 457). In the 18th century, England and France shifted from intra-European trade to intercontinental
trade (Kriedte 1983, Chap. 3), and by the 1770s Atlantic trade became the engine of European economic growth
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European countries imposed severe restrictions on the import of grain, one of the main foodstu¤s,
thereby adversely a¤ecting most peoples living standards. The second epoch (1830s1870s) was
marked by a decisive shift toward free trade. The resulting inux of grain, especially from the New
World and Russia, had substantial impacts on income distribution within societies. In response to
the grain invasion, many of these nations went back to the protection of domestic agriculture, a
competing sector. This political backlash characterizes the third epoch, which continues today. On
top of these three historical stages, the theory developed in this paper predicts a second wave of
globalization in the fourth and nal stage. Thus, economies undergo two surges of liberalism with
a stage of protectionism in between.
This paper accomplishes two worthy objectives. The primary objective is to analyze the non-
monotonic evolution of trade policy experienced by Western Europe, a region plausibly regarded
to have been scarce in land and abundant in capital.5 This nonmonotonicity reects qualitative
changes in individuals stances on trade liberalization in the process of economic development.
The present paper provides a political-interest-based explanation for the determination of openness
through an internal political process, rather than through diplomatic games played among trading
countries.6 The secondary objective of the paper is to explain why some economies do not achieve
trade liberalization and remain stagnant.
This paper develops a two-sector, two-good, overlapping-generations economy that uses two
specic factors, land and capital, and one mobile factor, labor.7 The model features three elements
that alter individuals trade policy preferences in the growth process. The rst element is the
expansion of consumption bundles. While there are two marketable consumption goods, food and
a manufactured good, the former is essential to low-income households for their survival. Hence,
(ibid., 125). For example, Carolinas rice exports increased vefold between 1720 and 1740 (Nash 1992, 687).
5According to careful investigation by Rogowski (1989, pp. 154158), as late as 1600, Northwestern Europe was
abundant in capital and scarce in land, whereas Eastern Europe was abundant in land and scarce in capital. During
the 16th century, the vast granaries of eastern Germany and Poland had achieved rapid growth, and by the rst half
of the 17th century, an annual average of 140,000 tons of grain owed into North-Western Europe through the Danish
Sound (De Vries 1976, 33). Although England was a net exporter of many types of grain in the rst half of the 18th
century, this was largely because of the bounty and was thus known as a forced export(Ormrod 2003, 216217).
6The interest-based approach is adopted by Rogowski (1989), who applies the StolperSamuelson theorem to
interpret class and rural/urban conicts over trade policies in 19th-century European nations. However, he neither
constructs a formal model nor discusses the determination of trade policy. The present article extends this line of
research in order to analyze the dynamic interaction between trade policy and economic growth.
7While the model is an extension of Galor and Moavs (2004) one-sector, one-good growth model, their research
accomplishes a di¤erent objective. They explore the e¤ects of distributional policies on subsequent output growth in
a closed economy, and suggest that the qualitative e¤ects depend on the stage of development.
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their desired trade policy minimizes the unit cost of food. The second element is the expansion of
income sources, in the sense that higher-income earners derive revenues from capital, in addition
to their wage incomes. Because wages and interest rates are a¤ected in opposite ways by trade
liberalization, the level of savings is a key determinant of preferences over trade policy. The third
and last element is the absence of land markets. This prevents the returns on land and capital
from being equalized, which provides landowners with an incentive to support proagricultural trade
policies.
The theory developed in this paper presents the following scenario for the evolution of a land-
scarce, capital-abundant economy. In the early stages of development, the economy operates under
a closed system in which, because of the scarcity of land and the necessity of food, the agricultural
sector absorbs a substantial part of the labor force. The resulting low wages (in terms of food)
prevent the landless poor from purchasing the nonessential manufactured good, and their poverty
sustains the economic dominance of landlords. In contrast, opening up to international trade
breaks this class structure by placing egalitarian pressure on the income distribution. That is, food
consumption by the poor is enhanced while landlords rents are reduced. These two egalitarian
forces of globalization the rise of the working class and the fall of the landed elite are a prime
incentive for landlords to prefer autarky. Therefore, the initial development process entails a
political struggle between landed and landless interests. Provided that the former group wields
political power, the economy adopts protectionist policies.
Although free trade raises landlordsrevenues derived from industrial capital, this positive e¤ect
is not dominant in the initial stages when industrial capital is a minor asset in their portfolios. How-
ever, in later stages, capital accumulation, in conjunction with a limited supply of land, gradually
raises the relative importance of capital for landlords and thereby makes industrial specialization
protable for them. Through this mechanism, an epochal policy switch to free trade takes place
and dissolves class conict between landlords and workers. The theory of this paper also raises the
possibility that the economy remains closed because of the supply of land: given a certain amount
of land, landlords adhere to protectionist policies because agriculture is their main income source.
For this reason, an abundance of land tends to prevent or delay the industrialization process under
free trade.
As the economy develops under free trade, further specialization in manufacturing raises wage
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rates (in terms of food), and this eases the food constraint that binds the working class. This
improvement in living standards permits landless workers to consume the manufactured good as
well as food. In these circumstances, they may be less supportive of liberal (i.e. proindustrial and
antiagricultural) policies, because industrial specialization raises the relative price of the manu-
factured good. Noting that the degree of worker opposition to liberalization hinges on the wage
elasticity with respect to the trade policy that is pursued, the theory predicts that the elasticity
depends on the supply of land. Consistent with the historical experience of Western Europe, it
is shown that the protection of agriculture emerges in moderately land-scarce countries (such as
Germany and France), whereas severely land-scarce countries (such as the United Kingdom) tend
to maintain liberalism. Hence, as long as rising wages lead to an extension of the franchise, the
political participation of the landless class causes a resurgence in protectionism.
Unless the political backlash is overwhelming, capital accumulation continues to boost output
and real wages, which ultimately enables everyone to generate savings. Because trade liberalization
leads to a rise in interest rates, all individuals support proindustrial liberal policies in later stages
of development when their savings are su¢ cient and when owning land is not particularly lucrative.
This eventual shift to liberalism should be interpreted as a prediction of the type of trade policy
to be pursued in a forthcoming stage of development. This is because most current developed
countries still adhere to agricultural protection. In other words, it is di¢ cult to introduce trade
liberalization without promoting political conict. This is because reaching such a high stage of
development requires highly productive technology in the industrial sector.
It is worth discussing the empirical relevance of the model developed in this paper. The model
can be viewed as a ramication of the HeckscherOhlin model, in the sense that it enables one
to explore the e¤ect of a relative commodity price on factor prices. While many empirical papers
based on postwar data nd that the HeckscherOhlin model performs poorly (see, e.g., Leontief
1953 and Treer 1995), ORourke et al. (1996) nd that it performs reasonably well in the late
19th century, which is the period on which this paper focuses. Their results indicate that the
factor-price convergence between the Old and New Worlds in this period was driven by commodity-
price convergence. This evidence supports the factor-price-equalization theorem derived from the
HeckscherOhlin model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents historical evidence on European
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trade policy and economic development. Section 3 describes the basic structure of the model.
Section 4 derives the market equilibrium and the political equilibrium in each period. Section 5,
the main part of the paper, demonstrates the coevolution of trade policy and output, as experienced
by industrial economies, and also demonstrates the possibility of a poverty trap arising because of
a failure to liberalize trade. Section 6 concludes the discussion and proposes possible extensions to
the research. Proofs of technical results are in the Appendix.
2 Historical Evidence
This section presents the historical evidence on Western European trade policy and economic
development that supports the central argument of the paper.8 As mentioned in the introduction,
this paper considers trade in goods between Western Europe and other regions. The investigation
dwells on the role of trade policy, rather than transportation costs, in determining a countrys
openness. Moreover, in the context of the paper, trade protection means restrictions on the imports
of agricultural goods, rather than of manufactured or other goods. The following three epochs
construct a broad picture of the history of Western European trade policy over the last three
centuries.
2.1 The Age of Protectionism, 16601830s
Protectionism was the prevailing doctrine in Europe during this period, and the import of grain
was severely constrained by national laws, the most well known and important of which were the
British Corn Laws, which were in force until 1846.9 According to Bairoch (1989, 78), It should be
noted that Corn Lawswere a quasi-permanent feature of tari¤ history in most European countries.
They had always aimed at a precarious balance between protecting local agriculture and preventing
the price of bread rising too steeply.For instance, Burkes Act of 1773 xed the threshold price
for the domestic market, above which wheat could be imported, at 44 shillings per quarter, and
was later raised to 80 shillings per quarter by the law of 1815 (ibid., 8).10 Likewise, in France,
8 I thank Daniel Mejia and Je¤rey G. Williamson for supplying Figure 1 and Figures 2(a)2(b), respectively.
9The term corndid not merely mean American corn or maize; rather, the term meant grains such as wheat, oats,
rye, barley, malt, peas, beans, and maize (Barnes 1965, 7). Although the British Corn Laws existed before 1660, it
was not until 1660 that the government restricted the import of grain and encouraged grain exports (Barnes 1965,
8 and Glamann 1974, 465). Unlike the UK, most European countries were protectionist at least until the early 19th
century (Bairoch 1989, 67). This paper conventionally sets 1660 as the initial period of analysis.
10A quarter of wheat was 217:7 kg.
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landowners succeeded in introducing a sliding scale tari¤ to protect cereals between 1815 and 1845
(Fohlen 1973, 30). Before the 19th century, protectionist policies against foreign grain generally
restricted intracontinental trade, rather than intercontinental trade.11
The absence of grain imports kept European economies under agricultural-land constraints.
Using British data from between 1565 and 1936, ORourke and Williamson (2000) found a clear
relationship between commodity and factor prices and endowments for the pre-1828 period. They
also noted that this relationship broke down after 1828, rather than after the 1490s, which was the
era of the Voyages of Discovery. Based on this nding, they suggest that for the period before 1828,
the closed-economy model is superior to the open-economy model, which is better for the period
after 1828.
Some evidence indicates that the living standards of the working class did not improve in this
epoch; rather, they deteriorated. For instance, Allen (2001, 427429) reports that indicators of
the welfare of laborers in many European cities trended downward or were stable between 1500
and 1800; they suggest that incomes were just enough to cover rents and necessities. Similarly,
Ho¤mann et al. (2002) found that for the period between 1500 and about 1800, both unskilled
labor and luxury goods generally became cheaper relative to staple foods (grains and bread) in
major European regions (Table 2 and Figure 1, 331333). They also found that working people
spent a greater share of their budgets on grain than did upper class people in England and Wales,
France, and the Netherlands (Table 1, 326327).12 Consistently with this evidence, the growth
model developed in this paper predicts that the relative price of food rises under autarky.
11 It appears that intercontinental trade in grain was not the primary concern of pre-19th century policy makers
because of substantial freight costs. Some historians, such as Irwin (2001) and Taylor (2002), argue that it was
underdeveloped shipping technology, rather than protectionist policies, that constrained intercontinental trade from
the 16th century to the 18th century. While Europe engaged in trade with other continents, such as the New
World, Asia, and India following the Voyages of Discovery, most traded commodities between 1500 and 1800 were
noncompeting luxury goods, which were of high value relative to their transport costs. Examples include pepper,
other spices, cotton textiles, tea and co¤ee from Asia, and sugar, tobacco and silver from the Americas (Findlay
and ORourke 2001, 710 and Table 1). Because luxury goods were beyond the budget of low-income groups,
intercontinental trade was of little relevance to living standards, except those of elite Europeans (Irwin 2001 and
Williamson 2002c, 16).
12 In England and Wales in 1688, the bottom 40% of income earners spent about 35% of their incomes on bread
and other grain, whereas the top 5% spent only 4.2% on these goods. In France, rural workers spent 30.8% of their
incomes on bread and other grain in 1763, whereas middle and upper class people spent only 1.7% on these items in
1788. This implies that the relative price of grain was more important for the living standards of poorer people.
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2.2 The First Period of Globalization, 1830s1870s
The triumph of liberalism was symbolized by Britains repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.13 Williamson
(1990, Table 1, 128) estimates that the ad valorem tari¤ equivalent on grain in Britain fell from
about 71% to about 22% between 1815 and 1845 a signicant step toward free trade. Britains lib-
eral ideas spread throughout most of Europe, especially after 1860, when Britain and France agreed
on the Anglo-French treaty that incorporated the most-favored-nation clause (Bairoch 1989, 40 and
Minchinton 1973, 100).14 Wheat continually came into Europe from Australia, Argentina, India,
the American mid-west, and Canada, and the value of wheat exports from America increased 20-
fold between 1850 and 1915 (Woodru¤, 1973, 660).15 In Germany, Belgium, and France, imports
of grain accounted for 3% of domestic production in the period 18621866 and reached 20% in the
18761880 period (Bairoch 1989, 47).
The dismantling of agricultural protection and the associated inow of grain on an enormous
scale brought about two major changes in European economies. The rst was that within-country
wealth inequalities were reduced. ORourke and Williamson (2003) report that in Northwestern
Europe, the wageland rent ratio had been rising in the 18th century and began to fall in the 19th
century. The second was the specialization in capital-intensive goods, which shifted workers from
agricultural to industrial sectors. Britains agricultural workforce began to decline after 1850. This
decline was tied to the introduction of new technologies as well as to massive increases in agricultural
imports (Pomeranz 2000, 287). These two dramatic changes show that trade liberalization and the
accompanying grain inows caused a structural breakdown; they transformed Western Europe from
an autarkic economy to an open economy and led to the elimination of resource constraints.
Meanwhile, political power was wielded by the landed elite in most European nations. For
example, Aydelotte (1967, 51) reports that the share of the British aristocracy and gentry in the
13As is conventional, this article denes the 1830s as the rst period of globalization. While the triumph of liberalism
was symbolized by Britains repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, the onset of liberalism dates back to the early 1820s.
The progress of British liberalization was gradual but steady during the subsequent period of policy reforms. In 1822,
the nation reduced the threshold price (referred to in Section 2.1) to 70 shillings per quarter (Bairoch 1989, 9).
14The most-favored-nation clause is a formula by which each of the two signatories to a treaty agrees to grant
the other any advantage, favor, or privilege with regard to trade or navigation that it granted at the time of signing,
or that it would grant in the future, to any other nation (Bairoch 1989, 3839). According to Minchinton (1973,
100), the abolition of grain duties was conducted by the Zollverein in 1853, by Britain in 1860, by France and the
Netherlands in 1862, by Italy in 1870, and by Belgium in 1871.
15The increase from the late 19th century onwards occurred mainly because of reductions in transportation costs
and advances in the technology used for wheat production, rather than because of liberal trade policy. This is because
agricultural protection prevailed during this period in Western Europe.
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House of Commons was roughly 80% in 1846, the year in which the Corn Laws were repealed.
Moreover, as depicted in Figure 1, before the 1870s, the franchise was limited to a small segment of
the population in the main parts of Europe, except France. Because landlords were in the richest
class during this period and because restriction of the franchise was based on incomes, arguably
the most common form of political regime in Europe was one in which the landed elite dominated.
Hence, many of the landlordspreferences were presumably reected in the trade policies adopted,
and trade liberalization would not have been achieved without their broad support.
One of the potential forces behind the policy switch to free trade was, as mentioned in the
introduction, the rising relative importance of industrial capital in landlordsportfolios.16 This
hypothesis is consistent with the empirical work of Schonhardt-Bailey (1991), who focuses on the
case of Britain in the rst half of the 19th century. She has documented the increased diversication
of the asset portfolios of British landowners and found that Members of Parliament representing
more diversied constituencies were more likely to vote for free trade. In addition, Thompson
(1994, 166167) has documented the aristocracys decreasing dependence on agricultural incomes
in the 19th century in England.17
2.3 Political Backlash, 1870s Onwards
As shown by Minchinton (1973, 100), the retreat from free trade occurred in much of continental
Europe in the late 19th century (in Italy in 1878, in Germany in 1879, in France in 1881, in
Bulgaria in 1883, in Switzerland in 1884, in Rumania in 1886, in Belgium and Sweden in 1887,
and in AustriaHungary, Spain, Portugal, and Russia in the same decade). The impact of cheap
New World and Russian grain became evident in European markets by the late 1870s and 1880s,
as is apparent from the 50% decline in real British land rents between 1870 and 1913 (Findlay
and ORourke 2001, 35). The general response to this grain invasionwas to protect domestic
agricultural sectors to a greater extent than industrial sectors.
16According to ORourkes (2000) recent review of British trade policy, economic historians suggested two other
major reasons for the repeal of the Corn Laws. Kindleberger (1975) suggests that economic ideas convinced the
voters of the e¢ ciency of free trade. By contrast, Irwin (1989) argues that a gradual loss of faith in Malthusian and
Ricardian theories prompted the prime minister Robert Peel to convert to liberalism. By contrast, this paper focuses
on another potential source of trade liberalization.
17An empirical study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) provides indirect evidence for the view that real-estate
ownership a¤ects trade-policy preferences. Based on recent individual-level survey data for the United States, they
conrm that trade barriers were more likely to be supported by individuals who owned houses in counties where
industries with comparative disadvantages were concentrated. Home ownership in their study plays a similar role to
that played by the ownership of agricultural land in this paper.
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Table 1 Import Tari¤ Levels in 1913 (percentage of value)
Country Manufacturers Wheat
AustriaHungary 20 35
Belgium 9 0
Denmark  0
Finland 28 0
France 21 38
Germany 13 36
Italy 20 40
Netherlands  0
Norway  4
Portugal  prohibitive
Spain 34 43
Sweden 25 28
Switzerland 8 2
United Kingdom 0 0
Continental Europe 19 25
Source. Bairoch (1989, Table 9, 76 and Table 16, 139).
Evidence of this series of political backlashes can be observed in time-series and cross-sectional
data. The time-series data illustrated in Figures 2(a)2(b) show that several geographically large
countries, such as AustriaHungary, France, Germany, and Italy, were mainly raising tari¤s during
this epoch, whereas the United Kingdom, a geographically small country, was not.18 In fact, the
United Kingdom maintained free trade until 1932 (Bairoch 1989, Section VI). Turning to the cross-
sectional data, the bottom row of Table 1 shows that continental Europe was on average more
protectionist against imports of wheat than against imports of manufactured goods. This was the
case in AustriaHungary, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and, to some extent, Portugal.
The United Kingdom, in sharp contrast, displayed considerable and widespread liberalism. The
asymmetry in European political responses was initially identied by Kindleberger (1951, 33). He
argues that the response of Germany, France, and Italy to the decline in the world price of wheat
was to impose tari¤s in an attempt to maintain the relative price of wheat and to protect grain
18Between the 1870s and the 1890s, the average tari¤ rate increased from 4.4% to 10.1% in France, and from 3.8%
to 9.1% in Germany (Blattman et al. 2002, 5).
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Table 2 Net Exports, 18761880 and 1913: Actual Prices ($ million)
18761880 1913
Region Primary Products Manufactures Primary Products Manufactures
United Kingdom  1245 640  1836 1150
NW Europe  960 630  2830 1523
Other Europe 235  120 104  555
USA and Canada 270  90 559  157
Oceania 326  361
Latin America 936  828
838  1250
Africa 373  425
Asia 843  786
Sources. Findlay and ORourke (2001, Table 4), originally from Lamartine Yates (1959, Tables A.19-A.22).
*Includes Oceania, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
producers,whereas Like Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium, Denmark did not impose a tari¤
on wheat.A plausible conjecture based on the time-series and cross-sectional data is that between
the 1870s and 1913, core European countries generally became protectionist against foreign trade
and that there was more protection of agriculture than industry.
The resurgence of protectionism was not su¢ ciently powerful to cause a return to the economic
isolation that prevailed before the rst period of globalization (Williamson 2002a, 4). As shown
in Table 2, despite their proagricultural policies, Northwestern Europe and the United Kingdom
remained net importers of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods at the be-
ginning and at the end of this epoch, whereas the opposite is the case for all the other regions.
Two empirical observations are consistent with this articles view that the retreat into pro-
tectionism was provoked in part by expansion of the working classes.19 First, Figure 1 clearly
illustrates that many European nations experienced a dramatic extension of the franchise around
the end of the 19th century, which implies that the middle class was gaining political inuence.
Second, in a study that quanties the potential impact of cheap grain, ORourke (1997) found that
the welfare e¤ects of the grain invasion on workers di¤ered between European nations. As does
the present paper, the study of ORourke examines two opposing e¤ects of free trade on the real
19Because there are only two income classes in the economy analyzed below, in the context of the model, the term
workersincludes small-scale capitalists, whose major source of income is wages.
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wage e¤ects incorporated in the standard ruralurban specic-factors model: the decline in the
value of the wage in terms of manufactured goods and the rise in the value of the wage in terms of
food. By utilizing a computable general equilibrium model that has parameters based on empir-
ical data, ORourke found that the former negative e¤ect outweighed the latter positive e¤ect in
France, which had a large agricultural sector, whereas the opposite was true for Britain, which had
a small agricultural sector (ibid., 792). By combining these two results, this article asserts that
within Western Europe, di¤erences in the sizes of agricultural sectors may have been associated
with diverging political responses to the grain invasion.
The protection of agricultural sectors continues, as was demonstrated at the World Trade Or-
ganization meeting in Mexico in 2003. Coppel and Durand (1999, Figure 1, 20) found evidence of
stationary trends in producer support estimates (PSEs) in OECD countriesagricultural sectors
between 1986 and 1998. During this period, the PSEs remained at about 40% in the European
Union, at about 20% in the United States, and at about 60% in Japan; these levels are well above
those prevailing in Australia and New Zealand (ibid., 6). In contrast, trade liberalization in man-
ufactured goods has been successful. Findlay and ORourke (2001, Table 5, 67) have documented
the declining trend in average tari¤s on manufactured goods for 27 major countries between 1913
and 1998. Intercontinental price gaps between 1950 and 2000 were cut by 76%, of which no less
than 74% can be attributed to trade liberalization (Lindert and Williamson 2001, Table 1). These
reports suggest that manufacturing sectors contribute most to trade liberalization.
2.4 Summary
This historical evidence teaches one that a countrys trade policy can vary over time in accordance
with its stage of economic development. A country may even experience an ebb and ow in its
trade policies during the growth process, as is evident from the political backlashes that occurred
in 19th-century continental Europe. Another lesson is that the opening of an economy to inter-
national trade paves the way to modern growth by alleviating the economys resource constraints.
Hence, international trade appears to have a considerable inuence on economic growth and living
standards. These important points are conrmed by the theoretical analysis that follows.
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3 The Model
Consider a two-sector overlapping-generations economy operating in a two-good world over an
innite discrete-time horizon. The three factors of production are land, capital, and mobile labor.
An agricultural good is produced in one sector by employing land and labor, and a manufactured
good is produced in the other sector by using physical capital and labor. Economic growth is driven
by capital accumulation, which is a¤ected by trade policies but not by other potential forces such
as population growth, technological progress, and the expansion of land supply.20
The economy may take part in international trade in nal goods without a¤ecting world markets.
Whereas the world economy does not impose restrictions on trade, the economy under study may
become protectionist. In this event, the government would only use tari¤s for protection, and tari¤
levels would be determined endogenously through the internal political process. Tari¤ revenues are
not rebated to individuals but are spent on consumption by the government.
3.1 The Production of Final Goods
The production environments are perfectly competitive, and households rent land, capital, and
labor to producers. Independently of political decisions about trade policies, all agents in the
markets act as price takers who can perfectly predict the future course of the economy. Labor is
perfectly mobile between sectors, and inputs are, unlike nal goods, immobile between countries.
3.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
This sector produces the agricultural good, which is both perishable and indispensable for survival.
Production is based on CES technology. Let Xt and LAt denote the quantities of land and labor
employed by this sector in period t. The output of the agricultural good produced in period t, yAt ,
is then
yAt = F (Xt; Lt) = A[aX

t + (1  a)Lt ]1=; (1)
with A > 0; a 2 (0; 1) and  2 ( 1; 0). The parameter restriction imposed on  means that one of
the Inada conditions cannot be satised: that is, the marginal productivity of each input does not
remain nite as the corresponding input approaches zero. As shown subsequently, this property
20Letting physical capital a¤ect agricultural production would not alter the basic results, provided that the accu-
mulation of aggregate capital caused labor to ow to the manufacturing sector.
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permits complete specialization in manufacturing in the later stages of economic development.21
Producers in period t maximize their prots given pt, the price of the agricultural good, t, the
rental price per unit of land, and wAt , the wage per unit of labor in period t. For convenience,
the manufactured good is taken as the numeraire. This standard optimization problem is solved
by maximizing ptyAt   tXt   wAt Lt with respect to Xt and Lt. Substituting a xed land supply,
X > 0, into the resulting inverse demand functions yields
t = ptFX(X;Lt);
wAt = ptFL(X;Lt);
(2)
where Fi denotes the partial derivative of the function F with respect to argument i. In what
follows, this notation applies to all functions.
3.1.2 The Manufacturing Sector
This sector produces the manufactured good, which can be consumed or stored, based on Cobb
Douglas technology. Let Kt be the aggregate quantity of capital employed by this sector in period
t. In addition, let the working population in each period be normalized to unity for notational
simplicity. Because there is no unemployment in these competitive environments, the output of the
manufactured good produced in period t, yMt , is
yMt =MK

t (1  Lt)1  =Mkt (1  Lt); (3)
where  2 (0; 1), kt  Kt=(1   Lt), and M > 0 denotes the level of technology. Note that kt is
the ratio of capital to labor employed in the manufacturing sector, not the capitallabor ratio for
the aggregate economy. As in the agricultural sector, producers in period t maximize their prots
given wt, the market wage per unit of labor, and rt, the rental price per unit of physical capital, in
period t. The market price of the manufactured good is normalized to unity. Therefore, the inverse
demand functions are
rt = Mk
 1
t  r(kt);
wt = (1  )Mkt  w(kt);
(4)
where the rate of return on labor, wt, increases with physical capital. For simplicity, it is assumed
that physical capital depreciates completely after being used.
21An economy that incorporates CobbDouglas technology would not completely specialize in manufacturing even
at such a stage of development. In this case, the central argument of the paper could be maintained, but simplicity
of exposition would be lost.
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3.1.3 The Allocation of Labor
Because of perfect labor mobility, wages are equalized across sectors producing positive amounts
of output, as follows.
w(Kt=(1  Lt)) = ptFL(X;Lt) (5)
This implies that the industrial sector is active and that Lt < 1 as long as the economy has a
positive amount of physical capital. Because of the bounded marginal productivity of agricultural
labor, by contrast, agricultural production may be zero depending on the amount of physical capital
relative to the amount of land. In other words, there exists a price level, pmint  w(Kt)=FL(X; 0);
below which the industrial wage remains above the agricultural wage and, hence, no one works in
agriculture. It follows that the employment of labor in agriculture is described by a single-valued
function such that, for a given pair (Kt; pt) 0;
L(Kt; pt) = Lt
8<: = 0 if pt  pmint ;2 (0; 1) if pt > pmint ; (6)
where LK() < 0 and Lp() > 0 in the second case (i.e., there is incomplete specialization). The rst
property implies that a rise in the industrial capitallabor ratio raises the wage rate in industry
and thus causes labor to ow from agriculture. The second property implies that a rise in the
relative price increases the marginal productivity of labor and thereby labor demand in agriculture.
In what follows, this paper assumes that the economy has a positive amount of physical capital, so
that the market wage rate equals wt in every period.
3.2 Individuals
A new generation, consisting of a continuum of individuals, is born at the beginning of every period
and lives for two periods. Hence, there are two generations in society at each point in time. The
population size of each generation is normalized to unity. Individuals may di¤er in their initial
endowments, but they are homogeneous in all other respects. An individual born in period t is
referred to as a member i 2 [0; 1] of generation t.
3.2.1 The Environment
In the rst period of life (youth), a member i of generation t does not work and consumes the
agricultural and manufactured good provided by his or her single parent. In addition, he or she
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may receive a transfer (in the form of the manufactured good) from his or her parent, bit  0, and
keep it for savings. In the second period (adulthood), the individual has a single child and acquires
one unit of labor. By supplying this labor inelastically, the individual receives wage income of wt+1,
which is the market wage rate at time t + 1 in terms of the manufactured good. Individuals who
have savings earn interest, and those who own land are paid interest by producers. To keep the
model tractable, suppose that there is no market for land in this economy because land is held
by previous generations and inherited by the next generation within dynasties. To summarize, a
member i of generation t has a second-period income of
Iit+1 = wt+1 + rt+1b
i
t + t+1x
i; (7)
where rt+1 is the net return on savings under the assumption of complete capital depreciation, and
xi denotes the amount of land owned by the individual.
3.2.2 Consumption
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper considers an extreme case of Engels Law. In other
words, individuals spend their incomes exclusively on the agricultural good, which is thought of as
staple food, up to a saturation level of c^ > 0. It follows that the household food consumption of a
member i of generation t; is
cit+1 = I
i
t+1=pt+1 if I
i
t+1  pt+1c^;
cit+1 = c^ if I
i
t+1 > pt+1c^;
(8)
where the rst expression applies when the food constraint is binding. Any remaining income is
allocated between mit+1, which represents household consumption of the manufactured good, and
bit+1, which represents a transfer of income to the child in the form of the manufactured good. The
allocation is chosen to maximize utility, which is given by
uit = (1  ) lnmit+1 +  ln( + bit+1); (9)
where  2 (0; 1) and  > 0: The utility function implies that bequeathing is motivated by the joy
of giving. 22 The budget constraint in this case is given by
zit+1  Iit+1   pt+1c^  mit+1 + bit+1;
22For simplicity, it is assumed that no one dies regardless of the amount of food consumption. Incorporating death
makes the model more realistic but does not a¤ect the papers qualitative results. The qualitative results of the paper
would survive the incorporation of a more realistic utility function, such as 1 ln(ct+1   c^) + 2 lnmt+1 + (1  1  
2) ln bt+1; provided that 1, the weight associated with excess food consumption, is su¢ ciently small.
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where zit+1 can be interpreted as net income, given that initial food expenditures of pt+1c^ are
required. It follows that
mit+1 =
8<: zit+1 if 0  zit+1 < ;(1  )(zit+1 + ) if zit+1  ;
bit+1 =
8<: 0 if zit+1 < ;(zit+1   ) if zit+1  ;
(10)
where   (1  )= > 0. Because of the inclusion of  > 0 in the utility function (9), low-income
households prefer consuming the manufactured good to leaving it to their o¤spring.
3.2.3 Group Structures
In period 0, there are two income groups, R (Rich) and P (Poor), which respectively comprise the
xed fractions  2 (0; 1) and 1    of adult individuals. Land and capital are distributed equally
within group R; whereas group P is proletarian. Because there is no within-group heterogeneity,
descendants can be fully identied by i = P;R in each period.
Linear homogeneity of the production functions implies that the allocation of aggregate income
is given by
yt = I
R
t + (1  )IPt : (11)
From (7) and (10), it follows that
IRt > I
P
t and b
R
t  bPt for all t  0: (12)
This is satised with equality only if bRt = b
P
t = 0: The strict inequality in the expression for income,
IRt > I
P
t , results from permanent inequality in the ownership of land and the monotonicity of the
returns on savings. Equation (12) implies that the initial ranking of wealth among individuals per-
sists into the future. This between-group inequality is plausible, given the historical evidence, and
enables an examination of the e¤ects of international trade on individuals whose living standards
di¤er.
4 Equilibrium
This section analyzes the determination of the competitive market equilibrium in each period.
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4.1 Aggregate Capital and Output
In the absence of opportunities for international lending and borrowing, aggregate savings form
aggregate capital in the subsequent period. Hence,
Kt+1 = b
R
t + (1  )bPt  Bt; (13)
where Bt denotes aggregate transfers in period t. Note that the savings of group R are indispensable
for the formation of physical capital.
Given (1), (3) and (13), aggregate output is expressed as
yt+1 = pt+1F (X;Lt+1) +MB

t (1  Lt+1)1   y(Bt; pt+1); (14)
where Lt+1 = argmax yt+1 because of perfect labor mobility. It follows that yB() = Rt+1 > 0
provided that the manufacturing sector is operative in period t+ 1: In addition, yp() = yAt+1  0,
which implies that a rise in the relative price of the agricultural good increases its value.
Given (6), the industrial capitallabor ratio is
kt+1 =
Bt
1  L(Bt; pt+1)  k(Bt; pt+1) > 0; (15)
where (Bt; pt+1)  0: Wage equalization (5) implies that k(Bt; pt+1) is a single-valued function
such that
kB() > 0; lim
Bt!1
k() =1; kp()  0; (16)
where the last inequality is strict because of incomplete specialization in period t+1. The economic
intuition behind these properties is worth emphasizing. First, a rise in aggregate transfers, Bt,
increases the capitallabor ratio in industry kt+1 by raising aggregate savings. Second, kp() is
positive because a rise in the relative price of food improves the marginal productivity of agricultural
labor and thereby attracts more workers to the agricultural sector.
4.2 The Political System
Let vit be the indirect utility of a member i of generation t: It follows from (8) and (10) that
vit =
8>>><>>>:
Iit+1=pt+1 if z
i
t+1 < 0;
(1  ) ln zit+1 if 0  zit+1 < ;
ln(zit+1 +
) + " if zit+1  ;
(17)
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where "  (1   ) ln(1   ) +  ln: In (7), income, Iit+1, includes the factor prices wt+1; rt+1,
and t+1, which are, as explained in Section 3.1, completely determined by the capitallabor ratio,
kt+1, and the relative price, pt+1. Hence, given (15), and noting that bRt = [Bt   (1   )bPt ]=; it
follows that
Iit+1 = I(kt+1; b
i
t; pt+1; x
i)  Ii(Bt; bPt ; pt+1);
zit+1 = I
i(Bt; b
P
t ; pt+1)  pt+1c^  zi(Bt; bPt ; pt+1):
(18)
Suppose that the economy has a comparative advantage in manufacturing in international
markets, in which the relative price of food is constant at pw > 0. Then, the domestic price
falls to a level that is on the interval [pw; pct+1]  pt+1; depending on the tari¤ level levied by the
home country. It follows that the preferred price for a member i of generation t (working in period
t+ 1) is
pit+1 =
8<: argmax(Iit+1=pt+1) if zit+1  0; 8pt+1 2 pt+1argmax zit+1 otherwise
9=;  pi(Bt; bPt ); (19)
where Iit+1 and z
i
t+1 are given by (18). This implies that the individuals preferred (optimal) trade
policy depends on his or her living standards. This is because the individuals consumption bundle
is larger the higher is individual income.
Consider a political system in which only young individuals (with perfect foresight) whose living
standards exceed some threshold have the franchise. Suppose also that majority voting determines
the trade policy that is implemented when they are adults. Because young individuals do not
supply labor, their living standards are completely dependent on their respective parentsincomes.
For simplicity, suppose that a young individual has voting rights if and only if his or her parent
earns enough to purchase the manufactured good as well as food. It follows from (12) that group
R has voting rights as long as the industrial sector is in operation.
This framework implies that one of two political regimes emerges during the process of economic
development. Under Regime I, the food constraint is binding for group P and, thus, political
decisions are made by group R: Under Regime II, su¢ cient capital has accumulated to raise the
income level of group P , and this enables their political participation. Formally,
pt+1 =
8<: pRt+1 if zPt  0 (Regime I);pPt+1 otherwise (Regime II). (20)
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4.3 The Dynamical System
It follows from (10), (11), and (12) that the evolution of aggregate transfers and of intergenerational
transfers within group P is given by
Bt+1 =
8<: max[yt+1   (1  )IPt+1   (pt+1c^+ ); 0] if zPt+1  (yt+1   pt+1c^  ) if zPt+1 > 
9=;
 (Bt; bPt ; pt+1); (21)
bPt+1 = max(z
P
t+1   ; 0)   (Bt; bPt ; pt+1);
where yt+1; IPt+1, and z
P
t+1 are given by (14) and (18).
Suppose that the economy begins operating under an agrarian, closed system in which much of
the labor force is absorbed by agriculture. Suppose also that underprivileged workers cannot a¤ord
to buy enough food. To be precise, agricultural employment in period 0, L0 = L, clears the food
market so that
F (X; L) = c^+ (1  )FL(X; L) < c^; L 2 (1  ; 1); (A1)
for which (1), (2), and (8) have been used. This condition holds when the saturation level of
food consumption, c^ , is su¢ ciently large, and when the amount of land, X , and the fraction of
landowners, , are su¢ ciently small.23 The remaining labor, 1  L, is employed in the production
of the manufactured good, which is consumed by group R. This means that young members of
group P have no voting rights and inherit nothing. Given (11), (A1), and (21), the initial transfers
are
B0 = max[Mk

0 (1  L)  ; 0]; bP0 = 0: (22)
where k0 = K0=(1  L) and the initial capital stock, K0, is historically given.
Because the path of intergenerational transfers, fBt; bPt g1t=0; determines all the economic vari-
ables in each period, equations (19), (20), (21), and (22) reveal that the evolution of the economy
under each regime is governed by a two-dimensional, rst-order, autonomous dynamical system for
Bt and bPt :
23The inequality in (A1) holds for a su¢ ciently large value of c^. This is because FL(X; L) decreases with c^.
Moreover, the properties of F () ensure that 1    < L < 1 if X and  are su¢ ciently small. On the one hand,
limX!0 L = 1 because limX!0 F (X;Lt) = limX!0 FL(X;Lt) = 0: On the other hand, lim!0 L < 1 because
F (X; 1) > FL(X; 1):
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Figure 3 depicts this dynamical system conditional on the stationarity of the world price pw:
The BB and bb loci are dened as the sets of all pairs (Bt; bPt ) for which Bt = (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w) and
bPt =  (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w); respectively. As was established in (12), there is no reversal of the initial
ranking of wealth across dynasties. Hence, the transfer to group P is below average and, thus, the
pair (Bt; bPt ) does not cross the 45
 line.
5 Trade Policy in the Growth Process
This section analyzes the evolution of a land-scarce economy and the associated ebb and ow
of protectionism reecting gradual changes in individual trade-policy preferences and extensions
of the franchise. It is shown that although the economy eventually liberalizes foreign trade, it
may go through a stage of protectionism between two surges of liberalism. As shown below, this
nonmonotonic transition of trade policies is consistent with the experience of 19th-century Western
Europe.
Each of Regimes I and II encompasses two phases of trade policy. Regime I-A is an under-
developed stage that is characterized by protectionism and political conict. The landless class
can only a¤ord staple food and, thus, individuals from this class support liberal policies. These
policies enable imports of inexpensive foodstu¤s. However, because working class people are not
su¢ ciently wealthy to have voting rights, political decisions are made by landowners, who support
the anti-industrial, protectionist policies that protect their gains from owning land.
Trade liberalization takes place and class conict dissipates under Regime I-B. The accumulated
capital stock raises the relative importance of capital in landownersportfolios and thereby induces
them to vote for proindustrial, liberal policies. Hence, despite the fact that landless workers have no
voting rights, the economy opens up to international trade, which provides workers with inexpen-
sive foodstu¤s. Although the landless cannot a¤ord manufactured goods, their food consumption
increases during the industrialization process.
Regime II-A is a semideveloped stage in which there could be a resurgence of protectionism.
Now that su¢ ciently high wages allow all members of the economy to consume the manufactured
good as well as staple food (i.e., the food constraint is not binding), individuals take into account
the e¤ects of free trade on the consumption of both goods. As a result, proindustrial policies may
not benet everyone, because the shift of labor into the manufacturing sector reduces that sectors
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labor productivity. In turn, this reduces the wage rate in terms of the manufactured good. These
increasingly enfranchised workers develop political inuence and, thus, the economy may return to
protectionism, as did 19th-century Germany and France.
Under Regime II-B, the economy has reached a highly developed stage that features established
liberalism and an absence of political conict. In this stage, the landless not only consume the
manufactured good but also leave capital to their o¤spring. Hence, the interest rate becomes an
additional factor through which trade policy a¤ects their incomes. The negative e¤ect of protec-
tionist policies on the savings rate counteracts the accompanying positive e¤ect on wages (in terms
of the manufactured good). For this reason, individuals with su¢ cient capital prefer free trade
because it maximizes their incomes.
5.1 Regime I: Dominance of the Landed Class
Under this monolithic regime, both political power and economic resources are in the hands of
those who own land, whereas other members of society have no voting rights and spend all their
wages on consuming food. In this case, the domestic price level solely reects landlordspreferences;
i.e., pt+1 = pRt+1: Living standards among the poor do not improve until the economy opens up to
international trade.
5.1.1 The Trade Policy Preferences of Group R
Under Regime I, the food constraint is binding for members of group P . It then follows from (7)
and (10) that members of this group transfer nothing to their o¤spring, who become wage earners.
Hence noting (11), the preferred price for a member of group R working in period t+ 1 is,
pRt+1 = argmax z
R
t+1 = [yt+1   (1  )wt+1   pt+1c^];
where yt+1 = y(Bt; pt+1) and wt+1 = w(k(Bt; pt+1))  !(Bt; pt+1). Noting that @yt+1=@pt+1 =
yAt+1; the objective function, z
R
t+1, exhibits convexity if the wage rate, wt+1, is concave with respect
to the relative price, pt+1: For simplicity, the following analysis assumes convexity of the wage rate,
in which case, landlords make a bilateral choice between free trade and autarky.24
Let pct denote the autarkic price in period t: Then, wage equalization (5) implies that p
c
t =
w(Bt=(1   L))=FL(X; L) under Regime I. This implies that L(Bt; pct) = L for any Bt > 0. As
24Lemma 8 in the Appendix shows that if  is su¢ ciently small, @2wt=(@pt)2 < 0; 8pt > pmin:
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shown below, L is the unique autarkic agricultural employment level under Regime I.
Lemma 1 If (A1) is satised and group R owns all capital, L is the unique employment level that
clears the goods markets under autarky in period t  0:
Proof. See the Appendix. 
It follows from (11), (17), and (A1) that a landlord (who owns capital) chooses between free
trade and autarky according to
sign(vR;wt   vR;ct ) = sign
n
[yM;wt+1   yM;ct+1 ] + [pwyA;wt+1   (1  )wwt+1   pw c^]
o
; (23)
where the superscripts w and c are, respectively, used to denote variables under free trade, (pt+1 =
pw), and variables under autarky, (pt+1 = pct+1), conditional on b
P
t = 0: If one views landlords as
the owners of all domestic rms, the rst and second terms in the square brackets of the above
expression indicate landlord gains and losses, respectively, from specialization in manufacturing.
These opposing e¤ects reect a trade-o¤ between the two assets capital and land in landlords
portfolios, and as shown below, their overall e¤ect depends on the amount of capital relative to
land.
The gain from industrial specialization that results from trade liberalization satises the rela-
tionship
yM;wt+1   yM;ct+1 > wwt+1(L  Lwt+1); (24)
which shows that there is diminishing marginal productivity of labor in manufacturing. Special-
ization causes the inegalitarian equilibrium (A1) to break down. This means that the value of
agricultural output is insu¢ cient to cover payments to workers, (1   )wwt+1, and landlordsfood
consumption, pw c^.
Clearly, trade liberalization benets group R if it leads to a substantial shift of labor from
agriculture to industry. This occurs in a land-scarce, capital abundant economy that needs a large
labor force for food production under autarky and that would specialize in manufacturing under
free trade.25 Landlords in such an economy would use more capital and less land to maximize their
incomes. Conversely, they support anti-industrial policies when there is insu¢ cient capital.
25Complementarity between capital and labor in manufacturing plays an important role by allowing capital accu-
mulation to improve marginal labor productivity and thereby increase industrial employment under free trade.
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Let B be the critical value of Bt for which the autarkic price, pct+1, equals the world price, p
w.
Because pct+1 strictly increases monotonically with Bt, it follows that p
c
t+1 > p
w for Bt > B. The
following lemma states that landlords reverse their trade policy preferences in an economy that has
a comparative advantage in manufacturing.
Lemma 2 If (A1) are satised and group R owns all capital, (1) vR;wt < v
R;c
t for a su¢ ciently
large Bt; and (2) v
R;w
t > v
R;c
t for Bt = B + "; where " > 0 is a su¢ ciently small value.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The transition in landlords trade policy preferences is illustrated by Figure 4. The focus is
on aggregate transfers on the interval ( B;1), where the economy has a comparative advantage in
manufacturing. The aggregate transfer, ~B, is dened as the critical level above which landlords
prefer proindustrial liberal policy, and the existence of ~B is guaranteed by Lemma 2. Landlords
support anti-industrial protective policies for Bt 2 ( B; ~B); where the economy has relatively little
capital.26
5.1.2 Regime I-A: Opposition to Free Trade
Under Regime I-A (0  t  ~t), the landed interests resist trade liberalization in order to protect
their income sources in agriculture. Political conicts arise between these protectionist landowners
and workers, who benet from free trade.
The Evolution of the Economy Consider an economy that initially has relatively scarce capital
but a comparative advantage in manufacturing. In other words, the initial transfer, B0 in (22), is
in the neighborhood of B and satises
B < B0 < ~B: (A2)
Recall also that young members of group P receive no transfers in period 0; i.e., bP0 = 0.
Equations (10) and (20) imply that the political state in period t is Regime I if Bt > bPt = 0:
Thus, Lemma 2 implies that27
pt+1 = p
R
t+1 = p
c
t+1 for Bt 2 [ B; ~B] and bPt = 0: (25)
26For simplicity, the gure depicts the situation in which there is a one-o¤ reversal of trade policy preferences. It
is assumed that if this is not the case, landlords continue to support anti-industrial, protective policies as long as Bt
falls into the interval ( B; ~B):
27 It is assumed that landowners support autarkic policy when they are indi¤erent.
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It follows that the government in period t + 1 implements the autarkic policy, which leads to the
inegalitarian equilibrium (A1) and thereby to mPt+1 = b
P
t+1 = 0. Therefore, political dominance by
anti-industrial landlords persists in the early stages of development when Bt  ~B:
Under these circumstances, intergenerational transfers are accumulated only by the rich. Equa-
tions (21) and (A1) reveal that the evolution of aggregate transfers is
Bt+1 = (Bt; 0; p
c
t+1) = [MB

t (1  L)1    ]; (26)
for Bt 2 [ ~B; B^] and bPt = 0: This shows the monotonicity of, and decreasing returns to scale
associated with, capital accumulation. The high employment level in agriculture, L; generates
a low wage rate, wt+1=pct+1 = FL(X; L); which impedes political participation by landless wage
workers. Wages do not rise until Bt rises above ~B to alter their trade-policy preferences.
It is necessary to dene three critical values of aggregate transfers. First, let B^ be the level
above which free trade releases wage workers from the food constraint; i.e., FL(X;L(B^; pw)) = c^:
Second, let B be the level above which wage workers bequeath to their o¤spring; i.e., !(B; pt+1) =
pt+1c^ + , where pt+1 is given by (30) below. Third, let B0 denote the level above which the free-
trade policy leads to complete specialization in manufacturing; i.e., !(B0; pw) = pwFL(X; 0).28 In
order to exclude some potential scenarios that are beyond the scope of this paper, it is assumed
that
~B < B^; B < B0: (A3)
The rst condition ensures that the food constraint is binding for group P in the rst period of
trade liberalization. The second condition ensures that complete specialization occurs only in fairly
advanced states of development. This implies that B^ < B:29 Thus, it follows from Assumptions
(A2) and (A3) that, as depicted by Figure 3,
B < B0 < ~B < B^ < B
 < B0: (27)
To ensure that the economy goes through the all stages of trade policy, it is assumed that the
28The condition ~B < B^ holds if c^ is su¢ ciently large. The condition B < B0 holds if the parameter a 2 (0; 1) in
the agricultural production function (1), which represents the weight attached to land, is su¢ ciently large; note that
FL(X; 0) = A(1  a)1=:
29The relationship B^ < B holds because the condition B < B0 implies wage equalization of the form
FL(X;L(B
; pt+1)) = ~c+ =pt+1; where Lt+1 = L(Bt; pt+1) decreases with Bt and increases with pt+1:
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manufacturing technology, M , is productive enough to satisfy30
Bt < [MB

t (1  L)1    ] for Bt = B;B0: (A4)
This condition permits aggregate transfers to grow monotonically under autarky and ultimately to
exceed the critical level ~B an event that changes landlordstrade preferences. The last period of
Regime I-A, ~t; is the period in which the critical level is exceeded for the rst time; i.e., Bt  ~B for
t 2 [0; ~t) and Bt > ~B for t = ~t. Note that between-group income inequality expands under autarky.
This is because the living standards of group P do not improve despite the growth in aggregate
output, yt.
Political Conicts The rst phase of Regime I is characterized by political conict between the
two income classes groups R and P disagree on trade policy. Trade liberalization benets the
members of group P , who care only about food consumption, because specialization in manufac-
turing boosts the wage rate in terms of the agricultural good, FL(X;Lt). Despite the desirability
of free trade for group P , the economy remains closed under Regime I-A to enable landlords to
secure their gains from agriculture. Proposition 1 below summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 1 Under (A1)-(A4); there is between-group conict over trade policy (i.e., pRt = p
c
t >
pw = pPt ) for t 2 [0; ~t].
The Failure of Liberalization and the Poverty Trap Note that ~B is the critical level for
free trade and industrialization to take o¤. However, the economy may stagnate under Regime
II-A without reaching ~B; depending on the availability of land. This is because the level of X
is an important determinant of the timing of the shift in landlords trade-policy preferences. A
rise in X reduces the autarkic employment level, L in (A1), and thus lowers landlordsgains from
industrial specialization. In this case, a large amount of capital is necessary for landlords to support
a proindustrial, antiagricultural policy. As a result, the take-o¤ condition (A4) is not satised and
the economy remains autarkic and inegalitarian.31 This result indicates that there may be income
30The condition (A4) holds if M is su¢ ciently large, noting that both B^ and B0 approach zero as M becomes
innite.
31 If X is su¢ ciently high, the economy converges to a steady-state equilibrium in which it has a comparative
advantage in agriculture. This case is not discussed in this paper.
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di¤erences over time between countries that have comparative advantages in manufacturing.32
5.1.3 Regime I-B: The First Period of Globalization
When aggregate transfers exceed ~B for the rst time in period ~t; the economy enters Regime I-B
(~t < t  t^), under which free trade, led by the landed class, is a feature. Although free trade
benets the members of group P , the political power is still wielded by group R; who own all the
capital.
The Evolution of the Economy As shown by Lemma 2 and Figure 4, landlords prefer proin-
dustrial liberal policies when aggregate transfers exceed ~B: Thus, it follows from (20) that
pt+1 = p
R
t+1 = p
w for Bt > ~B and bPt = 0: (28)
This means that the government in period t + 1 implements free trade, which breaks down the
inegalitarian, autarkic equilibrium (A1). Nevertheless, as long as Bt is below B^; the food constraint
remains binding for group P (i.e., zPt = wt+1   pt+1  0) and, thus, mPt+1 = bPt+1 = 0:
Under these circumstances, intergenerational transfers are accumulated only by the rich. Equa-
tion (21) shows that the evolution of aggregate transfers is
Bt+1 = (Bt; 0; p
w) = [yt+1   (1  )wt+1   (pw c^+ )]; (29)
for Bt 2 ( ~B; B^] and bPt = 0; where yt+1 = y(Bt; pw) and wt+1 = !(Bt; pw). The resulting growth
path of aggregate transfers is above that of autarky because, as depicted by Figure 4, free trade
generates higher incomes for members of group R; who own all the capital. Therefore, under
assumption (A4) free trade permits aggregate transfers to grow monotonically and ultimately to
exceed B^ an event that triggers political participation by members of group P . The nal period
of Regime I-B, t^; is the period in which the critical level is exceeded for the rst time; i.e., Bt  B^
for t 2 [0; t^) and Bt > B^ for t = t^.
Note that capital accumulation under free trade causes labor to shift from agriculture to in-
dustry, thereby increasing food consumption, cPt = FL(X;Lt)  c^. Thus, unlike before, the living
standards of those in group P improve under Regime I-B, and, ultimately, the food constraint does
32This is in line with the work of Galor et al. (2002), who landlordsopposition to industrialization in a closed
economy.
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not bind. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the agricultural sector when  is su¢ ciently small.
Noting that 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between land and labor, the agricultural
production function (1) exhibits quasi-Leontief properties: marginal labor productivity, FL(X;Lt),
is constant, except when employment is around X, above which it is very low. In these circum-
stances, Lt decreases monotonically toward X under Regime I-B and eventually falls below X in
period t^+ 1:
Political Conict In the second phase of Regime I, class conict dissipates: the two income
groups agree on trade policy, even though the franchise is limited to group R: Opening up to
international trade leads to a reduction in agricultural employment, which leads to a collapse of the
inegalitarian equilibrium (A1), in which the living standards of the masses are low. The resultant
improvement in the wage in terms of food, FL(X;Lt); benets the members of group P , who care
only about food consumption until (and including) period t^. For this reason, the liberal policy
pursued under Regime I-B benets the members of both groups P and R. The discussion is
summarized below.
Proposition 2 Under (A1)-(A4); there is no political conict, and free trade is preferred by all
individuals (i.e., pw = pRt = p
P
t ) for t 2 (~t; t^].
5.2 Regime II: The Rise of the Working Class
Regime II is characterized by the political participation of members of group P , on whom the food
constraint is no longer binding. The landless group, P , becomes the major political power, and the
domestic price level fully reects its preferences; i.e., pt+1 = pPt+1:
5.2.1 The Trade Policy Preferences of Group P
Equations (19) and (20) show that a landless member of generation t prefers a price of
pPt+1 = argmax z
P
t+1 = [!(Bt; pt+1) + (Bt; pt+1)b
P
t   pt+1c^]; (30)
where zPt+1  IPt+1  pt+1c^: This expression incorporates two opposing e¤ects of trade protection on
the members of group P; who now consume the manufactured good as well as staple food. On the
one hand, trade protection improves the purchasing power of the manufactured good by raising the
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wage rate, wt+1. On the other hand, it reduces the interest rate, rt+1, and lowers the cost of food
consumption, pt+1c^:
Because the labor allocation does not change when complete specialization develops, it is clear
that @IPt+1=@pt+1 = 0 for pt+1  pmint+1. By contrast, (4), (5), and (15) imply that, under incomplete
specialization,
@IPt+1=@pt+1 = t+1FL(X;Lt+1)[1  (1  Lt+1)bPt =Bt]; (31)
where pt+1 > pmint+1 and t+1 2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of the wage rate, wt+1, with respect
to price. The members of group P oppose the free trade policy (i.e., pPt+1 > p
w) provided that
@IPt+1=@pt+1 > c^ for pt+1 = p
w. As shown below, their preferred price depends on the wage
elasticity and their capital share.
First, consider the case in which bPt = 0 and members of group P have no capital income.
It follows from (31) that pPt+1 > p
w if, under free trade, (1) specialization is incomplete (i.e.,
pw > pmint+1), (2) the food constraint is not binding (i.e., FL(X;L(Bt; p
w)) > c^), and (3) the wage
elasticity, t+1, is su¢ ciently high. In fact, the last condition is satised if the wage rate in terms
of food, FL(); is inelastic with respect to Lt+1.33 Given these properties of the wage, the adverse
e¤ect of trade protection on food consumption is mitigated and, hence, wage earners are induced
to vote for a protectionist policy that balances the consumption of these goods, and against free
trade, which minimizes the unit cost of food.
These outcomes are illustrated by Figure 5, in which the agricultural production function incor-
porates a su¢ ciently small  (i.e., a low elasticity of substitution between land and labor). Observe
that labor productivity, FL(X;Lt), is constant unless the landlabor ratio is close to unity. More-
over, labor productivity exceeds c^ and the food constraint is not binding, with Lt being su¢ ciently
smaller than X: Therefore, conditions (1)(3) above are satised if agricultural employment under
free trade, L(Bt; pw); is positive but not too high. Given the denitions of B^ and B in (A3), the
preceding analysis can be used to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If (A1)-(A4) are satised when  is su¢ ciently small, members of group P oppose free
trade (i.e., pPt+1 > p
w) for Bt 2 (B^; B) and bPt = 0:
Note that under the assumptions of Lemma 3, wage earners are more likely to prefer free trade
33Equation (35) in the Appendix shows that  t !1 and t ! 1 as  !  1, provided that X=Lt > 1:
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when land is scarce.34 This indicates that an abundance of land is a unique determinant of the
trade policies pursued under Regime II.
Second, consider the case in which bPt > 0 and the members of group P have capital income, in
which case, the wage elasticity matters less to them. It follows from (31) that they would prefer free
trade if the ratio bPt =Bt, which is a measure of between-group equality, were su¢ ciently large and
close to unity.35 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Wealth equality diminishes
between-group heterogeneity and thereby induces all individuals to maximize their average net
incomes, (yt+1  pt+1c^) in (11), when the food constraint is not binding. Pursuing free trade is the
best way of meeting that objective because, as (14) implies,
pw = argmax[y(Bt; pt+1)  pt+1c^]; (32)
where Bt > B^. However, because the food constraint is binding on the members of group P; they
support free trade to maximize their food consumption. The following lemma summarizes this
discussion.
Lemma 4 If (A1)-(A4) are satised and bPt =Bt is close to unity, the members of group P support
free trade; i.e., pPt+1 = p
w:
5.2.2 Regime II-A: Political Backlash
As a result of industrialization under free trade, the wage rate exceeds average food expenditure,
pw c^, and the economy enters Regime II-A (t^ < t  t). Workersgrowing demands for the man-
ufactured good may trigger a resurgence of protectionism in agriculture because workers are not
wealthy enough to make transfers to their o¤spring.
The Evolution of the Economy Recall that B is the minimum level of aggregate transfers
above which workers bequeath to their o¤spring; that is, !(B; pt+1) = pt+1~c + . Given the
properties of !(Bt; pt+1); as long as Bt is between B^ and B; the wage rate, wt+1, is high enough
for wage workers to purchase the manufactured good for consumption but not high enough to
34This is explained as follows. Given (5), it follows that @Lt+1=@X > 0, FLX(X;Lt+1) > 0 and, thus,
@(X=Lt+1)=@X > 0 for a given pair (Bt; pt+1): Then, (35) in the Appendix shows that the wage elasticity, t+1,
increases with X.
35Given that linear homogeneity of the agricultural production function implies that FL(X;Lt)Lt < yAt+1; a su¢ -
ciently large value of bPt =Bt makes the right-hand side of (31) less than y
A
t+1, which represents agricultural output,
and thereby less than c^, which denotes aggregate food consumption.
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make transfers to their o¤spring. Hence, members of group P earn nothing but wage income when
aggregate transfers are in this interval.
Under these circumstances, intergenerational transfers are accumulated only by the rich. Equa-
tion (21) indicates that the evolution of aggregate transfers is
Bt+1 = (Bt; 0; pt+1) = [yt+1   (1  )wt+1   (pt+1c^+ )]; (33)
for Bt 2 (B^; B] and bPt = 0, where yt+1 = y(Bt; pt+1); wt+1 = !(Bt; pt+1); and pt+1 = pPt+1
are given in (30). Given that the wage income of an adult individual, wt+1; is greater than his
or her food expenditure, pt+1c^, group Rs total expenditure on the manufactured good, [yt+1  
(1   )wt+1   pt+1c^], exceeds its capital income, yMt+1: In addition, such high wage rates imply
that agricultural employment, Lt+1, is below the autarkic level, L. Therefore, Assumption (A4)
implies that aggregate transfers grow monotonically to reach, then ultimately exceed, the critical
level B an event that triggers intergenerational transfers within group P . The last period of
Regime II-A, t; is the period in which this critical level is exceeded for the rst time; i.e., Bt  B
for t 2 [0; t) and Bt > B for t = t. Given that there is capital accumulation under Regime II-A,
and given Lemma 3, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 3 If (A1)-(A4) are satised for a su¢ ciently small , the economy adopts a protec-
tionist policy (i.e., pt > pw) for t 2 (t^; t]:
As shown in Figure 5, agricultural employment under Regime II-A remains below X and, hence,
the wage rate in terms of food, FL(); exceeds c^: Because the wage rate is inelastic, the landless wage
workers prefer a protectionist policy that balances the consumption of these goods to free trade,
which minimizes food expenditure. Their political inuence, in addition to capital accumulation,
improves their living standards over time.
Recall that wage workers in land-scarce economies are more likely to prefer free trade, as
mentioned in relation to Lemma 3. Hence, the theory developed in this paper suggests that trade
policies may di¤er between economies under Regime II-A: Moderately land-scarce economies tend
to be protectionist, whereas severely land-scarce economies maintain their liberalism. This result is
consistent with ORourkes (1997) explanation of the di¤erence in trade policies between England
and France in the late 19th century.
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Political Conict Regime II-A is characterized by the possibility of the revival of class conict.
As shown by (32), the no-tari¤ price level, pw, maximizes the aggregate value of Iit+1 pt+1c^, which
can be interpreted as net income in the sense that each adult individual exclusively spends pt+1c^ on
food consumption. Given that his or her indirect utility, represented by (17), strictly increases with
net income, it follows that free trade policy is preferred by at least one group. This fact, along with
Proposition 3, leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If (A1)-(A4) are satised and  is su¢ ciently small, there are between-group con-
icts(i.e., pt = pPt > p
R
t = p
w) for t 2 (t^; t]:
Note that in Proposition 4, it is landowners rather than workers who support the free trade
policy. This is because these homogeneous landlords are best interpreted as capitalists whose
dominant income source is capital. Given a more general distribution of land ownership, landlords
with extremely large land holdings would not necessarily favor free trade.
5.2.3 Regime II-B: The Second Period of Globalization
Aggregate transfers exceed B in period t and, accordingly, the economy enters Regime II-B
(t > t), in which a chain of intergenerational transfers emerges within group P . All individuals
derive capital revenue and earn wages. This implies that the interest rate emerges as an additional
factor through which the relative price, pt+1, a¤ects income, IPt+1. The adverse e¤ect of an increase
in pt+1 on the interest rate, Rt+1, counteracts its positive e¤ect on the wage rate, wt+1, which
causes the economy to adopt liberalism as it develops.
Conditional Dynamics For analytical purposes, rst consider the evolution of transfers under
free trade as a benchmark. Given the properties of !(Bt; pt+1); as long as Bt exceeds B; the wage
rate, wt+1, is su¢ ciently high for the members of group P not only to consume the manufactured
good but also to make transfers to their o¤spring. Hence, it follows from (21) that the conditional
dynamical system for Bt > B and bPt  0 is
Bt+1 = (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w) = [y(Bt; p
w)  pw c^  ];
bPt+1 =  (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w) = (wt+1 +Rt+1b
P
t   pw c^  );
(34)
where b() = 0; wt+1 = !(Bt; pt+1), and Rt+1 = (Bt; pt+1): Because aggregate wage income, wt+1,
exceeds aggregate food expenditure, pw c^; aggregate net income, yt+1   pw c^ , exceeds aggregate
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capital income, yMt+1: Hence, given Assumption (A4), aggregate transfers grow monotonically and
ultimately exceed B0 an event that triggers complete specialization in manufacturing. Thus, in
the long-run, landlords lose their rents and all individuals have the same income sources, wages and
savings. This result indicates that an egalitarian steady-state equilibrium exists, as the following
lemma states.
Lemma 5 If (A1)-(A4) are satised, the conditional dynamical system (34) has a unique steady-
state equilibrium, B = bP :
Proof. Equations (34) and (A4) yield a unique, locally stable, steady-state level of aggregate
transfers of B = [y( B; pw) pw c^ ] > max(B; B0): By denoting the associated capitallabor ratio
by k  k( B; pw); it follows that B( B; bPt ; pw) = R(k) < 1 and, thus, there is a unique steady-state
level of transfers of bP = [w(k) +R(k)bP   pw c^  ] > 0. In the steady-state equilibrium ( B;bP ),
complete specialization in manufacturing yields aggregate output of y( B; pw) = w(k) + R(k) B.
This implies that B = bP : 
As (32) implies, given aggregate transfers of Bt > B^; free trade maximizes the aggregate con-
sumption of food, aggregate consumption of the manufactured good, and aggregate transfers. That
is, free trade is Pareto optimal, which is intuitive for an economy with a comparative advantage
in manufacturing. However, from the microeconomic point of view, free trade may not be desir-
able for the members of group P ; this depends on their capital shares, as explained in Section
5.2.1. Nevertheless, the next lemma ensures that intergenerational transfers within group P grow
monotonically.
Lemma 6 If (A1)-(A4) are satised,  (Bt; bPt ; p
w) > bPt for Bt > B
 and bPt 2 [0;bP ):
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, free trade after period t generates monotonic growth in bPt , although it is not necessar-
ily desirable for members of group P: Figure 3 represents the conditional dynamical system (34)
graphically. The BB and bb loci are dened as the set of (Bt; bPt ) for which Bt = (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w) and
bPt =  (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w); respectively. Given the results above, the BB locus is vertical at Bt = B and
has a unique intersection with the parabola-shaped bb locus at point ( B;bP ). The diagram shows
that choosing a free trade policy in Regime II-B results in monotonic growth of the pair (Bt; bPt ),
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which approaches the symmetric steady-state equilibrium, ( B;bP ). Hence, the following lemma can
be stated.
Lemma 7 If (A1)-(A4) are satised, free-trade economies under Regime II-B converge to the
egalitarian steady-state equilibrium given by B = bP :
Note that on the transition path, aggregate output, yt, industrial output, yMt , and the capital
labor ratio, kt, monotonically grow, whereas agricultural output, yAt , monotonically declines
eventually to zero.
Unconditional Dynamics It is now time to consider the endogenous determination of trade
policy. As shown below, aggregate transfers remain su¢ ciently large after period t and, thus,
members of group P retain political control over trade policy.
Proposition 5 If (A1)-(A4) are satised, the economy converges to the free trade, egalitarian,
steady-state equilibrium ( B;bP ; pw).
Proof. Assumption (A4) and equation (32) ensure that Bt remains in the interval (B; B) under
Regime II-B. Given that, as shown by (30), the prevailing price level is preferred by members of
group P; equation (12) and Lemma 6 indicate that bPt almost reaches Bt in the long run. Thus, it
follows from Lemma 4 that the economy ultimately liberalizes foreign trade. Lemma 7 states this
result. 
Hence, the economy liberalizes foreign trade in the long run despite the possibility of a political
backlash under Regime II-A. After the second phase of trade liberalization, which is permanent,
occurs, aggregate output, yt, industrial output, yMt , and the capitallabor ratio, kt, monotonically
increase, as described by the conditional dynamics. Note that there is necessarily complete special-
ization in manufacturing in the egalitarian steady-state equilibrium, in which all individual incomes
comprise wages and capital revenues.
Political Conict Because the economy converges to the egalitarian steady-state equilibrium,
the theory developed in this paper implies that between-group heterogeneity and class conict
dissipate in the long run.
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Proposition 6 If (A1)-(A4) are satised, there is no class conict, and free trade policy is sup-
ported by everyone in the long run.
Proof. As the proof of Proposition 5 shows, the economy completely specializes in manufacturing
under free trade in the long run. In this case, landlords have no rents and, hence, equation (31),
which relates to group R, can be used to show that pRt+1 = p
w, noting that bRt > b
P
t from Lemma
12. 
This result should be interpreted carefully. The eventual return to liberalism and the dissipation
of class conict should be interpreted as a predicted outcome in an unattainable stage of economic
development. This is because most developed economies currently protect agriculture. In other
words, it is di¢ cult for economies to achieve trade liberalization without there being political
conict. The reason for this is that reaching such a stage of development requires highly productive
technology in the industrial sector.
6 Concluding Remarks
This article has developed a theoretical framework for understanding the evolution of trade policy,
underlying internal class conict, and growth performance over the last few centuries. It has
analyzed the dynamic interaction between trade policy and economic growth, and has thereby
bridged a gap between two strands of the literature: open-economy growth theory and endogenous
tari¤ theory. On the one hand, trade-policy preferences and the resulting trade policy depend
on the stage of economic development. Because of the distributional e¤ects of trade liberalization,
income sources and income levels both of which expand with economic development characterize
individual attitudes toward trade policy. On the other hand, engaging in international trade a¤ects
aggregate output, factor prices, and income distribution by promoting specialization in sectors in
which the economy has comparative advantages. This mutual dependence between trade policy
and industrialization facilitates an understanding of the evolution of economies.
Much of the papers focus is on 19th-century Western Europe, which had a comparative advan-
tage in manufacturing in global markets and pulled ahead of other nations through trade. Consistent
with this historical experience, the theory developed in this paper argues that capital-abundant,
land-scarce economies, such as those of Western Europe, experience an ebb and ow of liberalism
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during the growth process.
The rst wave of liberalism is triggered by a shift in landlordsattitudes to proindustrial policies.
This shift is associated with an increase in the importance of industrial capital to their portfolios.
Specialization in manufacturing, which follows trade liberalization, raises aggregate output by re-
leasing the economy from its land constraints. Trade also benets the landless poor by providing
them with inexpensive staple food.
The subsequent political backlash results from improved living standards and the accompanying
political participation of newly enfranchised workers, who care about the relative prices of both
capital-intensive goods and land-intensive goods. However, the retreat into protectionism is not
inevitable, and di¤erent countries may pursue di¤erent trade policies in this intermediate stage
of development. The paper predicts that political backlashes occur in moderately land-scarce
countries but not in severely land-scarce countries. These asymmetric results on trade protection
are consistent with the experience of Western Europe in the late 19th century.
The theory developed in this paper demonstrates that such economies develop through free
trade, although they may retreat temporarily into protectionism. By contrast, countries in which
landlords have large land holdings are likely to remain protectionist and stagnant. This is because
the landed interests in these economies have a strong incentive to oppose proindustrial policies in
order to protect their principal income source, which is rents. Such negative attitudes to industrial-
ization prevent improvements in working-class living standards and, accordingly, the masses must
spend most of their incomes on the consumption of staple foods, leaving no resources for savings.
Although this article has taken a novel approach to analyzing the relationship between trade
policy and economic development, it ignores several aspects relevant to the world economy during
the period under consideration. First, the model abstracts from technological progress, particu-
larly improvements in transportation productivity, which has promoted the integration of global
markets. Second, the analysis of this paper is limited to the direct, quantitative impacts of trade
in commodities on trading economies. However, as argued by Irwin (2001, 3), it is important to
consider Asian commodities, which were traded in small quantities, because these may have con-
veyed embodied new technology to Europe. Third, it is worth considering political games between
trading countries that adopt strategic policies. For this purpose, it is necessary to extend the
small-open economy framework, which abstracts from other countriestrade policies. Finally, this
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paper has analyzed an economy that produces a single manufactured good and, hence, has ignored
the protection of manufacturing sectors. Although the papers focus on agricultural protection is a
reasonable simplication for studying European trade policy before the 20th century, it would not
be appropriate for analyzing contemporary issues; currently, the protection of domestic industries
would a¤ect advanced economies more than would the protection of agricultural industries. Future
research should be directed to addressing these issues.
Appendix
Lemma 8 If  is su¢ ciently small, @2wt=(@pt)2 < 0;8pt > pmint :
Proof. From (4) and (15),
@wt
@pt
= w0(kt)kp(Kt; pt) = tFL(X;Lt) > 0 for pt > p
min
t ;
where
t 
1
1 + (1  Lt) t ;  t   
FLL()
FL() =
1  
Lt + (1  a)L+1t =(aX)
: (35)
Thus, the result is obtained by noting that FLL(X;Lt)Lp(Kt; pt) < 0 8pt > pmint : 
Proof of Lemma 1. Given that (12) implies that cRt  cPt ; there are two other autarkic
equilibria to be examined. If F (X;Lt) = cRt = c
P
t = c^, then (A1) implies that Lt > L and thus
cPt = FL(X;Lt) < c^; which is a contradiction. If c
R
t (= I
R
t =pt+1) < c^, there is no aggregate demand
for the manufactured good, and all workers would be employed in agriculture. Then, (A1) and (11)
imply that IRt =pt = F (X; 1)  (1  )FL(X; 1) > c^; a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The rst result follows from (23) and (24), noting that L 2 (1 ; 1). On the
other hand, the second result is obtained by noting that dwwt+1=dBt > 0 and dy
w
t+1=dBt = dy
M;c
t+1=dBt
for Bt = B in (23). 
Proof of Lemma 6. If Rt+1  1; then (34) implies that  (Bt; bPt ; pw) > bPt for all bPt  0: If
Rt+1 < 1; then (A4) implies that Bt > B0 and thus L(Bt; pw) = 0 by denition. Hence, the sign of
 B(Bt; b
P
t ; p
w) depends on the ratio Bt=bPt in this case, implying that the conditional steady-state
transfer, bPt =  (Bt; b
P
t ; p
w); is minimized at Bt = B: Then, the result follows from Lemma 5,
noting that  (Bt; 0; pw) > 0 for Bt > B: 
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